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1I would like to thank Gordon Belot for writing his thought provoking paper
and for discussions about this reply. Needless to say, I am sure he is not convinced
by my response.
1 Introduction: Belot’s Argument
Belot [5] presents a fair and detailed discussion of one of the themes I develop
in my book. This is the idea that fundamental theories that are related to
less fundamental “theories emeritus” by singular asymptotic limits, will very
likely, themselves, turn out to be explanatorily inadequate. Belot’s strategy
in arguing against this claim is to demonstrate that the mathematics of the
fundamental theory contains, in an appropriate sense, the mathematics of the
emeritus theory. And that, therefore, my appeal to the physically interpreted
mathematics of the emeritus theory in explanation is eliminable in favor
of the physical interpretation of the mathematics of the pure fundamental
theory. If this is right, and if such explanation provides understanding, then
fundamental theories (at least those considered in the book and by Belot) are
perfectly explanatorily adequate. Belot’s discussion is clear, but perhaps it
is worth rehearsing briefly the context once again for the case of the rainbow.
From the point of view developed in my book, the idea is that the wave
theory of light—the fundamental theory—is asymptotically related to the
ray theory of light—the emeritus theory—in the limit as the ratio of the
wavelength of light to the other relevant length scales (raindrop radius, for
example) approaches zero. My claim, in a nutshell, is that one cannot ex-
plain various features of the rainbow (in particular, the universal patterns of
intensities and fringe spacings) without ultimately having to appeal to the
structural stability of ray theoretic structures called caustics—focal proper-
ties of families of rays. Belot, on the contrary, attempts to show that it is
possible to speak about these structures and their stability without mention-
ing the concept of a ray of light, or of a family of such rays, by sticking purely
to the language of wave theory where such old fashioned concepts make no
appearance. Thus, I am being accused of improperly reifying the mathemat-
ical structures of the superseded emeritus ray theory when I claim that such
structures are required for genuine physical understanding. This objection
has also been raised by Michael Redhead in his review of my book forth-
coming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics. Redhead
says
What Batterman is effectively doing is to reify this auxiliary
mathematics so that the ray structure becomes part of the phys-
ical ontology of a new third theory inhabiting what he calls the
“no man’s land” between the wave and ray theories. But why
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can’t we leave the asymptotic analysis of universality at the level
of a purely mathematical exercise? This would be in line with
other developments in theoretical physics where surplus mathe-
matical structure with arguably no physical reference is used to
explain or “control” what is going on in a physical theory. Mod-




Let me begin my response by emphasizing one point about explanation that,
I believe, has been overlooked in these criticisms. I intended the arguments
in the book in part to demonstrate how very different the kind of explana-
tion required for an understanding of various universal features of, say, the
rainbow is from the types of explanations talked about in the extant philo-
sophical literature. That is to say, most contemporary philosophical accounts
of explanation simply do not have the resources to incorporate the types of
asymptotic analysis that Belot presents in his explication of the explanation
of the rainbow. As I said, and as Belot quotes, “. . . [t]hese emergent phenom-
ena are not derivable in any straightforward sense from the underlying wave
theory. They are not, as it were, from-first-principle solutions to the wave
equation. . . . They are deeply encoded in that equation but are apparent
only through its asymptotic analysis.”[4, p. 118]
The nature of this asymptotic explanation is really quite different (as Be-
lot’s extended technical discussion ably demonstrates) from the “standard”
(D-N type) accounts whereby one plugs the appropriate initial conditions
and boundary conditions into the fundamental (wave) equation, and then
deterministically/deductively grinds out the appropriate wave function for
the system’s state at some later time. The asymptotic investigation, involv-
ing the principle of stationary phase, the projection of the bicharacteristic
strips from the appropriate Lagrangian manifold onto configuration space,
etc., really does not much resemble standard accounts of “deriving the ex-
planandum from the explanans.”
Yet, Belot’s footnote, [5, p. 18] suggests that there is no genuine funda-
mental distinction between the type of asymptotic explanation I highlight and
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the D-N type accounts. He takes me to be providing a “friendly amendment
to the D-N account.” He cites Hempel, regarding the D-N model: “given this
notion of explaining a particular occurrence of a solar eclipse or of a rainbow,
etc., one can speak derivatively of a theoretical explanation of solar eclipses
or rainbows in general: such an explanation is then one that accounts for
any instance of an eclipse or rainbow.” [7, p. 423] Belot continues:
Clearly constructing an explanation of the rainbow in general
ought not to require providing a D-N explanation for each occur-
rence of the rainbow—one cannot consider infinitely many sets
of possible initial and boundary conditions, and show that each
leads to a rainbow. So charity would appear to require us to read
Hempel here as (perhaps imperfectly) perceiving the necessity
of [requiring some account of stability of the phenomenon under
physically realistic perturbations]. [5, p. 18]
In the book and in an earlier article [1] I emphasized a distinction between
kinds of explanatory why-questions. On the one hand, there are what I
called “type (i) questions.” These ask for the explanation of why a given
instance of a pattern obtained. Type (ii) why-questions, on the other hand,
ask why patterns of a given type can be expected to obtain. They are, in
effect, question about the existence of universal behavior. I argued that it is
far from obvious how D-N based models are capable of answering type (ii)
why-questions. In the present context, this distinction just is the distinction
between explaining each occurrence of the rainbow (type (i)) and explaining
the rainbow in general (type (ii)).
The question now concerns how to understand Hempel’s idea that we may
“speak derivatively of a theoretical explanation of solar eclipses or rainbows
in general.” The D-N model provides an account whereby we can explain
the particular occurrence of a solar eclipse or of a rainbow. It is unclear how
such an account (or even a collection of such accounts) can allow us to speak
“derivatively” of a general account that would answer the corresponding type
(ii) question. The point here, as I have emphasized in the book, is that each
such D-N account of a particular occurrence will be remarkably different
from all of the others. As Belot himself notes, each account will involve
different initial and boundary conditions—different shapes of the raindrops,
for example. Had we an explanation that answers the type (ii) question,
then it seems that, yes, we may very well speak “derivatively” of explaining
any given instance. We will have an account that tells us why many/most
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of those individual details can be ignored. That is just what asymptotic
explanation, as I have presented it, provides. Hempel and Belot, it appears,
get things backwards. The individual accounts—answers to type (i) why-
questions—are (in part anyway) dependent upon there being an answer to
the type (ii) question.1
I think that is fair to say that asymptotic explanation as I have presented
it is, at the very least, quite different from standard philosophical accounts.
Furthermore, it seems fair to say that Belot endorses the idea that expla-
nation often does involve asymptotic analysis and that, in particular, such
analysis is often involved in the demonstration of important stability results
required to understand universal behavior. As a consequence, I believe he
ought to be convinced that we really are discussing and employing a philo-
sophically new (or at least widely ignored) approach to explanation. The
question now concerns how radically different this approach really is. How
are we to understand the kind of asymptotic decoding of information con-
tained in the fundamental theory? Are we in any way forced to say that
despite this “containment” the fundamental theory is explanatorily inade-
quate?
2.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Fundamental Theory
As Belot notes, the cases I consider in the book are cases in which a cer-
tain partial differential equation depending upon some parameter needs to
be investigated in an asymptotic limit in which that parameter approaches a
limiting value (0 or∞). This investigation proceeds via an auxiliary problem
relating a set of curves in the cotangent bundle T ∗X of the manifold X upon
which the original equation is defined. These curves are the integral curves
of a vector field generated by the so-called “principal symbol” of the origi-
nal partial differential equation. One is interested in the projection of these
curves (bicharacteristic strips) in T ∗X down onto the manifold X. Such pro-
jections yield so-called “bicharacteristic curves” and we primarily care about
various lines of singularities that appear in the projection—intersections of
bicharacteristic curves in X projected down from the bicharacteristic strips
1I say “in part” here because I do not want to underestimate the value of a theory’s
being able to answer questions about why a particular instance of a general pattern obtains.
Rather, such an account is usually not the complete story of the phenomenon, as it seems
that relevant explanatory information is provided by being told that the instance is an
instance of a general pattern. See [4, Chapter 3].
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inhabiting the appropriate Lagrangian manifold in T ∗X.
Belot is completely correct that all of this is purely mathematical—in
fact, it is the precise description of the apparatus involved in the asymptotic
decoding of a partial differential equation depending upon some parameter.2
So if we set a mathematician, with no knowledge of the physical interpreta-
tion of the partial differential equation, the task of performing this asymp-
totic investigation, she will be able to construct a function characterizing
the asymptotic approximate solutions to the original equation. She will even
be able to show how such a solution is relatively stable under perturbations
of certain kinds—that is, she will be able to show that the structure of the
corresponding bicharacteristic curves on X will be diffeomorphically related
to each other under such perturbations.
But so what? Well, Belot argues that if we now tell the mathematician
that she has been investigating the wave equation and that she has “derived”
Airy’s integral, she will see that she has explained the fringe spacings and
intensities of rainbows. This requires that we
(i) . . . impart to her the standard sense of “the intensity of light”;
(ii) . . . explain why the given initial and boundary conditions cor-
respond to a situation in which a cloud of spherical water droplets
is illuminated by white light; and (iii) . . . explain why the pertur-
bations studied correspond to changes in the shape of the drops.
[5, p. 25]
Furthermore, “none of this would appear to require reference to the concepts
of geometrical optics [or ray theory].” [5, p. 25] Belot thinks this last claim
is particularly obvious with respect to (i) and (iii). Let’s consider (iii).
What is the relationship between the perturbation in the shape of a
macroscopic object like a raindrop say of radius r and the stability of pat-
terns of intensity of light in the asymptotic limit of the wave equation as
(λ/r)→ 0?3 One sees that when (λ/r) approaches zero, the contributions to
the integral describing the intensity of light become concentrated near certain
2At least his discussion provides the precise description. I, of course, am being sloppy
and leaving out many details.
3λ is the wavelength of the light—the parameter upon which the partial differential
equation (the wave equation) depends. Physically, one is investigating the regime in which
λ is small compared with the other lengths that figure in the problem, such as the radius
of the drop. This is important, otherwise the results of the limiting process with depend
upon a particular set of units chosen for the wavelength.
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lines (these are the bicharacteristic curves) that exit the raindrop at certain
angles. (This is what the principle of stationary phase tells us.) Now some
families of these lines of concentrated intensity intersect to form an envelope
(or curve) outside the raindrop. How do we fulfill (iii)? We must assert that
changing the shape of the raindrop (in effect, letting r vary in certain ways)
doesn’t effect the general “shape” of the envelope of the family of lines.
But now I am speaking the language of geometrical optics. The lines of
concentrated intensity leaving the raindrop are the rays and the envelope of
a family of such lines is a caustic. If I am going to say how the perturbation
of the shape of a macroscopic object, characterized by variations in r, figures
in the stability of the fringe spacings and intensities, then it seems I need
to refer to the relationship between that macroscopic object and the lines of
concentrated intensity exiting the object as its shape is altered.
Furthermore, note that the investigation of the shortwave limit of the
wave equation presents an interesting kind of problem. When (λ/r) = 0
the wave equation blows up. That is to say that the limiting behavior as
(λ/r) → 0 is qualitatively distinct from the behavior at the limit, when
(λ/r) = 0. What is the motivation for studying this singular limit? One way
to think about this is to note that we are investigating a kind of boundary
problem—we are looking at a place where the fundamental theory breaks
down completely. One attitude toward this might be to say that the fact
that the law breaks down at this boundary (in this limit) just shows that
the boundary is unimportant to the physics. After all the mathematics of
the fundamental theory is incapable of saying what goes on at the limit—the
wave equation makes no sense when there are no waves!
But boundary problems such as this crop up all over the place in physics.
One example, discussed by Mark Wilson [9] concerns the development of
shocks. Suppose we are interested in understanding the behavior of a gas as
it moves through a tube. If a collection of the molecules are given a push
(say by blowing into the tube at one end), then they will begin to catch up
to those in front resulting in a more densely populated region separating two
regions of relatively less molecular density. Across this region, molecules will
exchange momentum with one another as if “some kind of permeable mem-
brane were present.” The region occupied by this “membrane” is a shock.
Of course it is far too complicated to track the behavior of the individual
molecules as they move through the tube and undergo the collisions in the
shock region. And, once again, since we are interested in recurring phe-
nomena, the individual (molecular) details of the development of any one
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shock will be quite different from the details of the development of another.
Those details will, in other words be largely irrelevant to the pattern being
investigated. As a consequence (familiar story!) one approaches the prob-
lem asymptotically by taking a continuum limit. We model the collection
of molecules in the tube as a continuous fluid. Such a limit will shrink the
shock region onto a two dimensional boundary. Sufficiently far from either
side of the boundary the behavior of the fluid will be governed by the rele-
vant partial differential equations of fluid mechanics. However, the behavior
across the boundary is not governed by any differential equation at all. The
fluid mechanical equations blow up.
The shock boundary represents a situation in which the theory fails to de-
scribe what is going on. Nevertheless, the boundary is a dominant feature of
the phenomenon studied that, far from being unimportant, is crucial for sci-
entific understanding. As Wilson puts it, “the allegedly ‘suppressed details’
have become crushed into a singular (hence not law-governed) factor that
still dominates the overall behavior through the way in which it constrains
the manner in which the ‘law governed regions’ piece together.”[9]
The mathematical problem here is analogous to the problem of investigat-
ing the rainbow from the point of view of the asymptotics of the wave theory.
The blow up at zero wavelength represents a boundary upon which the fun-
damental theory itself fails. Yet that boundary dominates the phenomenon—
the behavior of the rainbow. In saying that the fundamental theory is ex-
planatorily inadequate, I mean to be saying that we must take this boundary
upon which the fundamental theory fails into consideration in our explana-
tion of what is going on.
I suspect that one intuition behind Belot’s (and Redhead’s) objection, is
that it looks like I am now saying that for genuine explanation we need to
appeal essentially to an idealization. In this case it is the idealization of zero
wavelength or equivalently, the talk of rays. But, of course, such an ideal-
ization is, as are all idealizations, strictly speaking false. And, furthermore,
in speaking of this idealization as essential for explanation, they take me (as
noted above) to be reifying the rays. It is this last claim only that I reject.
I believe that in many instances our explanatory physical practice demands
that we appeal essentially, to (infinite) idealizations.4 But I do not believe
that this involves the reification of the idealized structures.
Let me consider briefly one such situation referred to by Redhead in the
4See [3] for one such discussion.
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passage cited above. This concerns the mathematical apparatus of gauge
theories. Take the case of the Aharanov-Bohm effect.5 Here we see that an
electron looping around a solenoid containing a magnetic field (inside) and
zero magnetic field outside, picks up a phase proportional to the magnetic
flux through the solenoid. (This is prima facie odd as there is apparently
no “causal and local” interaction of the magnetic field upon the electron.)
One way of understanding this is to idealize the solenoid to be infinitely thin
and infinitely extended. This allows one to think of the space or spacetime
in which the electron evolves as being topologically nonsimply connected—
space or spacetime with a mathematical line removed from it.6 This ideal-
ization allows us to explain certain aspects of the the Aharonov-Bohm effect
by reference to topological properties of this idealized space or spacetime.
For instance, we can explain why it is that an electron that loops twice
around the solenoid will pick up twice the “geometric phase” as one that
loops around only once. Now, one might think that we should not appeal to
such an idealization in our explanation of the physical phenomenon observed
in Aharonov-Bohm experiments. Perhaps, we should appeal to “real” prop-
erties of loops in space or spacetime, thereby restoring a causal (if not local)
explanatory account.7
In arguing that an account that appeals to the mathematical idealization
is explanatorily superior to a theory that does not invoke the idealization, I
am not reifying the mathematics. (I therefore, agree Redhead, that the math-
ematics with “arguably no physical reference is used to explain or ‘control’
what is going on . . . .” [8]) Nevertheless, I am claiming that the “funda-
mental” theory that fails to take seriously the idealized “boundary” is less
explanatorily adequate.
5See [2] for an extended discussion.
6A space is nonsimply connected if there exist loops or paths in the space that cannot
be contracted to a point. Thus, any loop around the “solenoid”—that is, around the line
removed from the space—cannot be contracted to a point.
7This is Healey’s [6] position. See [2] for my response.
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